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Bums v. Commonwealth
541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001)
L Faas
On September 20, 1998, William Joseph Burns ("Bums") was drinking
heavily during the daywhe performing some home repairs at his trailer in Baker,
West Virginia. He resided there with his wife Penny Marlene Cooley Bums
("Penny"), and her two sons. The repairs were apparently not going well and
Bums became increasingly angry with his wife. As Bums had previously as-
saulted and battered Penny on several occasions when he was drinking, she left
the residence out of concern for her safety.1
Instead of going to the home of her mother in Edinburg, Virginia, as she
had on a previous occasion, Penny went to the home of her friends, the
Funkhousers.' Penny made several attempts to contact her mother, Tersey
Elizabeth Cooley("Cooley), in orderto let her knowthat she had left Bums and
to warn her not to let Bums into Cooleys home if he came there; Pennywas not
successful in reaching her mother.4 Burns showed up at the Funkhouser resi-
dence around midnight and asked Pennyto go home with him. She refused and
Bums left, returning approximately one hour later. He remained in his car
outside the Funkhouser residence until the next morning.5
On September 21, 1998, Penny's sister, Linda Yvonne Heres went to the
home of her seventy-three year-old mother and found signs of forced entry.
Upstairs she found her mother's unclothed dead body lying on the bedroom
floor, the room in disarray. A medical examiner performed an autopsy on
Cooley's body and reported that Cooley had nmiple injuries on her head, neck,
and upper chest including twenty-four fractures to her ribs.6 Cooley died from
"blunt force trauma to [the] chest, with rupture of the heart" and compression
of the neck"
1. Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872,878 (Va. 2001).
2. Id "The Funkhousers lived in Fort Valley, Virgnia, which is about a forty-five minute
drive from Cook/ys house in Edinburg." Id at nA.4.
3. Id at 878. Pe nystated that when she left him the fst time, Burms threatened to kill her




7. Id at 879. Dr. Frances PatriciaField, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the Northern
Virginia District Medical Examiner's Office, who performed the autopsy, reported that there "was
also a tearing of Cookys pericardium, causing blood to spill out of the heart into the chest cavity.
Id Dr. Field opined that a broken rib probablyhad punctured [Cooley's] heart% though direct force
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The forensic evidence collected from Bums, Cooley, and the crime scene
pointed toward Bums as the assailant! Bums was arrested, tried, and convicted
y a jury of capital murder in the commission of rape and/or forcible sodomy,
statutory burglary, rape, and forcible sodomy. At the conclusion of the penalty
phase, the judge, following the jury's recomnendations, sentenced Burns to
death on the capital murder conviction, eighteen years on the statutory burglary
conviction, and to life imprisonment on each of the convictions of rape and
forcible sodomy
II. Hddi
After considering Bums's assignments of error and the record, the Supreme
Court of Virginia found no error and affirmed both the capital and non-capital
convictions.Y°  The court held that the indictment was not
applied to the chest might have ruptured the heart" Id She concluded that Cooleydied within two
or three minutes of the heart rupture. Id at 879.
8. Id at 880. *Karolyn Leclaire Tontarski, a forensic scientist employed by the Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Giminal justice Services Division of Forensic Science, analyzed
the physicalevidence" and' reported the presence of spermatozoa on vaginal and anal smears taken
from the victim. Id Tontanri testified, based upon DNA testing results, that the sperm fraction
found in the vaginal swab was 1.6 to 100 million times more likelyto have come from Bums than
from any other randomly chosen individual and -the sperm fraction on the anal swab was 8.7 to
540 millon times more likely to have come from Bums than from any other randomly selected
individual." Id Tontarski also found sperm cells on several items in Cooleys bedroom and
bathroom. /d
9. Id at 877.
10. M at 897. Burms filed fortysix assignments of error, twenrysix of which were presented
on appeal Id at 880. Bums failed to brief a number of assignments of error, which were conse-
quently waived, the court did not consider them on appeal. Id at 880 n.7; sw Kasi v. Common-
wealth, 508 SX.2d 57, 60 (Va. 1998) (stating that issues not fuly briefed on appeal are waived).
These assignments of error will not e discussed in this note, nor will the following fourteen:
(1) First, Bums challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia capital murder statute. Id at
881. Because on brief Bums relied solelyupon his mremorandum presented to the circuit court and
did not brief the argument anew before the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court considered him
to have procedurllydefauled this claim. Ad
(2) When Bums was arrested, he was charged with first-degree murder. Id Following
indictment bya grand juryon two counts of capital murder, an order of nolle prosequi was entered
on the first-degree murder charge. Id Thus, Burns never had apreliminyhearing. Id On appeal,
Bums chimed that the circuit court erred byfaiing to quash the capital murder indictment on the
basis that he was denied a preliminary hearing. Id The Bwm court, citing Wdb v Cwc mmib,
held that a preliminary examination was not necessary because Burns was indicted by a grand jury.
ML; seeWebb v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E2d 22,27 (Va. 1%3) (stating that preliminaryexamination
of one accused of committing a felonynot necessarywhere indictmn has been found against him
by a grand jury.
(3) Bums chimed that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence,
including. all of Bums's statements to law enforcement officers; physical evidence, including DNA
testing results, seized from his person and residence; and all documents obtained from him. Buim,
541 S.E2d at 882. The court found no error. Ad at 882-86.
(4) Burns argued that the circuit court'erred byprecluding him from asking questions during
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voir dire to ascertain potential jurors' 'true feelings' about the death penaly" and by striking for
cause and failing to strike for cause respectively two jurors. Id at 887. After considering the entire
voir dire of both jurors at issue, the court found no error in the circuit court's decisions regarding
those jurors. Id; swMackall v. Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 759,766 (Va. 1988) (stating that "either
party may require prospective jurors to state clearly that whatever view they have of the death
penalty will not prevent or substantially impair their performance as jurors in conformity with their
oath and the court's instructions," but "that a partymay(not] inquire what prospective jurors' views
of the death penalty might be").
(5) Bums asserted that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim's
body into evidence. Bums, 541 S.E.2d at 887. The court held that the decision to admit photo-
graphic evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, after examination of the
photographs in question, found no abuse of discretion. Id at 887-88; swHedrick v. Common-
wealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 639, (Va. 1999), wt d&a 528 US. 952 (1999) (holding that admission of
photographic evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court).
(6) During the trial, the Commonwealth pllad a videotape for the jury of a conversation
between Burns and a friend. Bum, 541 SE.2d at 888. In addition to viewing the tape, the jurors
were provided with a transcript of the conversation over Bums's objection. Id Without challenging
the accuracy of the transcript, Bums contended that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to use
the transcript because it contained gaps and inaudible references and because it highlighted
prejudicial portions of the conversation. Id The Bwm court, citing Fis eravG7muad/, held that
the use of such a transcript is in the trial court's discretion, and found no abuse of discretion. Id;
see Fisher v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (Va. 1988) (stating that "[a] court may, in its
discretion, permit the jury to refer to a transcript, the accuracy of which is established, as an aid tounderstadi a recording').
(7) At trial, Bums attempted to elicit testimony from several witnesses regarding Cooley's
having revoked her power-of- attomeynaming Pennyas her attomey-in-fact, but the court sustained
the Commonwealth's objection. Brn, 541 S.E2d at 888. Burns was able to proffer testimonyto
that effect, but contended on appeal that the excluded evidence should have been admitted to show
a motive for Penny to kill her mother. Id Here, the Bwm court held that if there was error in
excluding the reasons why Cooley revoked the power of attorney, it was harmless because the jury
heard such information through other sources during the trial. Id
(8) Bums argued that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence his wife's testimony
regarding prior episodes of violent and threatening conduct, and Burns's tendency toward sexual
aggression when he consumed alcohoL Id at 889. The court found no error in the trial court's
admission of this testimony because it was admitted only for the purpose of showing why Penny
left her residence on the night of Cooley's murder. Id .
(9) During his pretrial incarceration, Bums wrote-several letters to his wife containing
incriminating statements and differing versions of the events surrounding Cooley's murder. Id At
trial, these letters were introduced into evidence through the testimonyof a lawenforcement officer.
Id On appeal, Burns claimed that the letters were admitted into evidence in violation of Section
8.01-398 of the Virginia Code, which makes private communications between married persons
privileged. I; seVA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-398 (Mvchie 2000).. Section 8.01-398 provides that:
Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify for or azainst each other in
all civil actions; provided that neither husband nor wife shall wit'out the conent of
the other be eamind in any action as to any communication privately made by one
to the other while married, nor shall either be permitted, without such consent, to
reveal in testimony after & marriage relation ceases any such communication made
while the marriage subsisted.
§8.01-398. Because the letters were not introduced by Penny, but rather by a law enforcement
2001]
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officer, the court held that theywere properly admitted bythe circuit court. Bmn, 541 S.2d at
889-90.
(10) Based on an evaluation bya clinical psychologist, the circuit court found Bums micompe-
tent to stand trial, resulting in his commitmnt to an inpatient psychiatric facilityprior to trial Id
at 890 n13. After approximatelyfour months, the court determined that Burns's competency had
been restored. I During the trial, Bums's counsel moved to have Burns evaluated for his
competency to stand trial pursuant to Section 19.2-169.1 of the Virginia Code. 14d at 890; see VA.
QODE ANN. S 19.2-169.1 (lichie 2000) (providing, in pertinent part, that [if... the court finds,
upon hearing evidence or representations of counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
Commonwealth, that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant lacks substantial capacity
to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorneyin his own defense, the court
shall order that a competencyevaluation be performed... ). The circuit court denied the motion.
Bwv, 451 SE.2d at 890. The court in Burn found, based upon review of the record, which
included testimonybythe jail nurse that Burns was taking his prescribed anti-depressant medication,
no probable cause to believe that Bums was not competent to stand trial Id at 890-91.
(11) Burns claimed that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict finding him guiltyof capital murder, rape, forcible sodomy, and statutoryburglary.
M4 at 891. He argued that because he was allegedly intoxicated, and the Commonwealth produced
conflicting evidence of his whereabouts on the night of Cooley's murder, the Commonwealth failed
to prove beynd a reasonable doubt that he committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder. Id The court rejected this claim, finding that the alleged conflicts regarding Bums's
whereabouts on the night in question were a matter for the to resolve, and that sufficient
evidence existed to support the jury's finding. Ie at 892. Burns also claimed insufficient evidence
of penetration to support his convictions for rape and forcible sodomy. I at 891. The court
likewise rejected this claim, finding that the presence of Burns's sperm on the victims vaginal and
anal swabs was sufficient to support a finding of penetration. I at 892.
(12) During the penaltyphase of the trial, Bums requested two jury istructions: (1) instruct-
ing the to consider as a possible mitigating factor that a sentence of life in prison means that
the defendant will never be eligible for parole"; and (2) instructing the jury that, with respect to
future dangerousness, it "may consider the fact that if you set the defendant's punishment at life
imprisonment, he will never be eligible for parole." Id at 895. The circuit court rejected both
proposed instruction as repetitious because the juryhad alreadyheen instructed that imprisonment
for life means life with no possibility for parole. Id
(13) Section 17.1-313(Q(1) of the V'aginia Code requires the Supreme Court of Virginia to
consider "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice
or any other arbitrary factor." Idat 896;s&eVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C(1) (Michie 1999). On
appeal, Burns argued that his death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion and
prejudice because the Virginia death penaltystatute is unconstitutional; he was not allowed to rebut
the Commonwealth's closing argument that, if Bums received life risonment, he would pose
a continuing danger to the prison staff and could escape from prison (this issue will be addressed
in the body of this note); and because the Commonwealth's Attorney referred to Burns as an
"animal," arguing to the jurythat their decision would "send a message." Bu m, 541 S.E.2d at 896.
The court rejected all of these arguments. 1Id
(14) Section 17.1-313(C)(2) of the Virginia Code r the Supreme Court of Virginia to
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or proportionate to the penatyimposed
in similar cases, considerng both the crime and the defendant." 1d; see S 17.1-313(q(2). Burns
argued that his sentence of death was disproportionate because of his low I, the physical and
sexual abuse that he suffered as a child, his incompetence to stand trial at one time, his continued
need to be medicated throughout the trial, and his symptoms of depression and anxiety. Burs, 541
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defective and that Bums was not entitled to examine police investigators under
oath to determine whether they turned over all exculpatory evidence to the
Commonwealth's Attorney." The court also held that "a determination of future
dangerousness revolves around [the] individual defendant and a specific crime"
committed, stating that evidence concerning prison life in general is not relevant
to that determination, and was, therefore, properly excluded by the tri.4 court as
rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness. 2 Finally, the
court held that the trial court did not err in denying Bums a mistrial as a result
of improprieties in the Commonwealth's dosing argument or in denying his
motion for a mental examination under Section 19.2- 300 of the Virginia Code."
III. A nldsis /Applii = V'wgmia
A. Mukplicim Ihdin t
The Commonwealth originally indicted Bums on two counts of capital
murder.'4 The first count alleged that he had committed capital murder in the
commission of robbery, and the second count alleged that he had committed
capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or object sexual
penetration.5 The Commonwealth then amended the first count, without
objection from Bums, and moved the circuit court to nol-pros the second
count. 6  On appeal, Bums claimed that the indictment against him was
multiplicious because he was charged with three separate offenses of capital
murder in one count."7 The court found that the indictment, as finally amended,
contained only one charge of capital murder with alternative "gradation" of-
fenses.18
Though Bums's objection would have been better articulated as a conten-
tion that the indictment was duplicitous, rather than multiplicious, the objection
is a sound one. The court's ruling on this matter appears to directly contradict
S.Ed at 897 n.18. Based on a review of Bums's case and similar cases, and noting Bums's prior
criminal history and the fact that it has approved a death sentence for a defendant with a signifi-
cantlylower IQ than that of Bums, the court concluded that Bums's sentence of death was neither
excessive nor disproportionate to sentences imposed in Virginia for comparable capital murders.
Id at 897.
11. Id at 882, 886.
12. Id at 893.
13. Id at 895; see alo VA CODE ANN. S 192-300 (NMchie 2000) (providing for a mental
examination prior to sentencing of anyperson convicted of an offense indicating "sexual abnormal-
itW).
14. Bwm, 541 S.E.2d at 881.
15. Id
16. Id at 881-82, 882 n.9. The count, as finallyamended, alleged that Bums "did unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kill and murderTerseyElizabeth Cooley,
in the commission of robbery or forcible sodomy or rape..'. Id at 882.
17. Id at 881.
18. Id at 882.
20011
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the holding of Paym v Ca nwua .t9 In Payn , the defendant was convicted of
killing two women." Regarding the first victim, Payne was charged in one count
with capital murder in the commission of robbery, in violation of Section 18.2-
31(4) of the Virginia Code, and in a separate count with capital murder in the
commission of rape, in violation of Section 18.2-31(5) of the Virginia Code."
Regarding the second victim, Payne was charged with capital murder while in the
commission of or subsequent to object sexual penetration, and in a separate
count with capital murder while in the commission of or subsequent to at-
tempted rape, both in violation of Section 18.2-31(5) of the Virginia Code.22 The
Paynm court held that subsections four and five of the Virginia capital murder
statute are separate offenses. 3 The court also held that killing in the commission
of attempted rape and killing in the commission of object sexual penetration are
two distinct statutoryprovisions of subsection five of the Virginia capital murder
statute and therefore constitute separate offenses. "
The indictment against Bums charged in a single count capital murder
coupled with robbery, forcible sodomy, and rape, each separated by the phrase
"and/or."" Under Payrm, this indictment should be read as three separate
offenses. The Burm court's holding that this method of charging constitutes one
charge of capital murder with alternative "gradation" offenses is irreconcilable
with Pawn. However, in Pouda v Qt," 2 6 the Virginia Supreme Court
held that amending a capital murder-robbery indictment to include a charge
under Section 18.2-31(5) "expand[s] the indictment to include a new and addi-
tional charge of capital murder. 2 7 Thus, the Poredl court, in accord with Paynr
19. Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E2d 293 (Va. 1999).
20. Id at 296.
21. Id at 296;swasoVA. CODE ANN. S18.2-31(4) (Michie Supp. 2001) (providing that "[t]he
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or at-
tempted robbery" constitutes capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(5) (Mfchie Supp. 2001)
(providing that "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission
of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or
object sexualpenetration constitutes capital murder).
22. Paym 509 S.E.2d at 298; see § 18.2-31(4); S 18.2-31(5).
23. Paj., 509 SE.2d at 301.
24. Id
25. Bwm, 541 S.E2d at 881-82.
26. 552 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 2001).
27. Powellv. Commonweath, 552 S.E2d 344,356 (Va. 2001). InPouz, the defendant was
originally charged with capital murder in the commission of a robbery and/or attempted robbery
in violation of Section 18.2- 31(4) of the Viuginia Code, attempted capital murder in the commission
of rape under Section 18.2-31(5), and other non-capital offenses. Id at 348. The Commonwealth
subsequendyaniended the capital indictment to also charge capital murder'during the commission
of or subsequent to rape and/or attempted rape and/or sodomy and/or attempted sodomy" under
Section 18.2-31(5). Id at 349.
[Vol. 14:1
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found that each of the subsections of Section 18.2-31 constituted discrete forms
of capital murder.28
These differing opinions create two distinct lines of authority. Depending
upon how a defendant is charged, defense counsel can use either Burs, or Payw
and Poudlto attack the indictment. If the indictment charges a violation of more
than one subsection of Section 182-31 or of more than one of the constituent
parts of subsection five, in a single count, then defense counsel should attack the
indictment as being duplicitous under both Parjw and Pouedl. Conversely, if the
indictment separates charges under the various subsections of Section 18.2-31
into individual counts, then defense counsel should attack the indictment as
being multiplicious under Burn.
B. Exnmain jLELadECm r Pesr
Before his trial, Bums moved to examine law enforcement officials under
oath to determine whether such officials had disclosed all exculpatory evidence
to the Commonwealth's Attomey" The circuit court denied the motion but
directed the Commonwealth's Attorney to explain the meaning of exculpatory
evidence to the police officers and ask whether all such evidence had been given
to the Commonwealth's Attomey. °
On appeal, Bums claimed that "the problem of police-concealed exculpa-
tory evidence is pervasive.., throughout the country" and that the trial court's
failure to grant Bums's motion "impinged on [his] constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel," as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process and a fair trial31 The court rejected this argument on several grounds.32
First, the court held that "to the extent that Burns raised an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, such a claim was not cognizable on direct appeal."33 The court
went on to cite K* v W/bi/ey"4 saying that it is "the individual prosecutor [who]
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police."" Finally, the court noted
that Bums had admitted that the Commonwealth's Attomey had disclosed all
exculpatory evidence in his possession prior to trial, and found the trial court's
28. Id at 356-57.




33. Id (citing Johnson v. Commonwealh, 529 SE.2d 769, 781 (Va. 2000)).
34. 514 US. 419 (1995).
35. Bwns, 541 S.E2d at 886 (alteration in original; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US. 419, 437
(1995) (holding that defendant is entitled to new trial because the net effect of state-suppressed




direction of the prosecutor to ensure that the police investigators had provided
all such evidence to be adequate.- 6
Approval of the circuit court's denial of Bums's motion can be seen as a
roadblock to combating the pervasive problem of police concealing potentially
exculpatory evidence from defense counsel. The last three major Brady v Mary
lam cases in the United States Supreme Court, Stri&kerv G " V K* W -
ly," and UnizteStatz v Bag6y' have dealt with this exact issue.4' When Stri&ler
was at the appellate level, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant had proce-
durally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it sooner.42 Though the Fourth
Circuit was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, this underscores the
importance of defense counsel continuing to make these motions for examina-
tion of law enforcement officials under oath to preserve the issue for appeal or
habeas. In Buns, the motion was not without its positive effect; it resulted in the
circuit court's direction to the prosecutor to ensure that the mandate of K*Ie be
followed.
Such motions are strengthened if the defense has information suggesting
that the prosecution is in fact withholding evidence. For example, if a witness
for the Commonwealth has given several conflicting statements, the Common-
wealth discloses only the final incriminating statement to defense counsel, and
defense counsel learns of the earlier conflicting statements, the court is more
likely to grant the motion. If, under these circumstances, the trial court denies
the motion, the issue is preserved for appeal or habeas.
In any case, such a motion will produce one of three possible outcomes:
first, the court may grant the motion; second, the court may simply deny the
motion; and third, the court may deny the motion but examine or instruct the
Commonwealth's Attorney. The first possible outcome is clearly desirable
because it may provide defense counsel with exculpatory evidence to be used at
trial The second and third possible outcomes preserve the issue for appeal or
36. Buns, 541 S.E2d at 886-87.
37. 373 US. 83 (1963).
38. 527 US. 263 (1999).
39. 514 US. 419 (1995).
40. 473 US. 667 (1985).
41. Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's withholding of
evidence favorable to an accused and material to either guilt or punishment violates due process).
SeStrickler v. Greene, 527 US. 263 (1999) (holding that defendant petitioner did not procedurally
default Brady claim by failing to raise the = until federal habeas proceedings, where exculpatory
evidence was not disclosed and where defense reasonably relied on prosecution's open file policy);
K*, 514 US. 419; United States v. Bagley, 473 US. 667 (1985) (holding that exculpatoryevidence
withheld by the prosecution is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
42. SeeStricklerv. Pruett, Nos. 97-29,97-30,1998 WL 340420, at *5 (4thar.June 17,1998)
(per curium) (unpublished) (holding that because the factual basis of defendant's Brady claim was
available to him at the time he filed his state habeas petition, defendant's failum to raise the claim
at that time constiuted procedural default).
[Vol. 14:1
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habeas and the third may produce evidence as well. All of these outcomes
suggest that defense counsel should continue to move to examine law enforce-
ment officers under oath in order to produce potentiallyundisclosed exculpatory
evidence.
C Derialol cnLoEsdwx
Prior to trial, Bums requested that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to a
regional director of the Virginia Department of Corrections seeking "documents
or records describing the daily inmate routine, general prison conditions, and
securitymeasures at the Red Onion Correctional Center and Wallens Ridge State
Prison... and videotapes" of those facilities.43 The Commonwealth moved to
quash the subpoena and, after a hearing, the circuit court granted the Common-
wealth's motion."
During the penalty phase of the trial, Bums sought to introduce evidence
concerning the security and day to day life of a prisoner incarcerated in a maxi-
mum securityprison in order to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence regarding
whether Bums would be a future danger." Bums argued that the evidence
should be admitted for the following reasons: (1) a defendant convicted of
capital murder can onlyreceive a sentence of death or life imprisonment without
parole; and (2) the only society to which such a defendant can ever pose a
"continuing serious threat" is the prison society. 6 Therefore, evidence regarding
the structure and quality of an inmate's life in a maximurm security prison,
including such a prison's security and safety features, is relevant to rebut the
43. Bum, 541 SE.2d at 892.
44. I Bums also requested that subpoenas be issued to the wardens of Red Onion and
Wallens Ridge. Id at n.14. Because the Commonwealth's motion to quash did not cover those
subpoenas, the circuit court did not address them in Its opinion. Id The circuit court did, however,
indicate that it would grant a motion to quash those subpoenas were such a motion before it Id
45. Bwm, 541 SE.2d at 892.
46. Id at 893. Se ahso VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Nfichie 2000). Section 19.2-264.2
provides that:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
be mpoed a sentence of death shall not be imposed unles the court or
jury shall ) after consideration of the past criminal recor of convictions othe
defendant, rd that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a anm~se~ia d7AWz to Soie... and (2)
recommend that the penalty of death be imposed.
Id (emphasis added). SwakoVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q (Nichie 2000). Section 19.2-264.4(Q
requires that:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove
beyod a reasonable doubt that there is a probabilitybased .upon evidence of the prior
history of the defendant or of the cirumstances surround'ng the co mmission of the
offense of which he is accused that he would commit crimmal acts of violence that




Commonwealth's evidence that a defendant would "commit criminal acts of
violence" in the future.47
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Bums's argument.4 It began by
citing the recent case of L ouat v Cnr wiz ,, in which the court held that a
jury's determination, under Sections 192-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(Q of the Virginia
Code, regarding whether a defendant "would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" is not restricted to
a consideration of only the prison society." The court stated that the evidence
was not admissible to dispel jurors' misconceptions about prison life."' Noting
that the Commonwealth introduced future dangerousness evidence consisting
only of Bums's prior criminal record and unadjudicated criminal acts, the court
found that Bums's evidence was not in rebuttal to anyevidence regarding prison
life.
52
Citing Chernix v Cmvmwth, 3 the court stated: "The United States
Constitution does not limit the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as
irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense."' The court found that the relevant inquiry,
therefore, was whether Bums uad (would be inclined to) commit criminal acts
of violence in the future and not whether he owd (would have the opportunity
to do so).55 The couit held that a determination of future dangerousness should
focus on an individual defendant and a specific crime.56 The court stated that
evidence offered on the general nature of prison life in a maximum security
prison was not relevant to this type of inquiry even when offered to rebut
evidence of future dangerousness such as a defendant's prior criminal record and
unadjudicated criminal acts. 7
47. SgepraJ!y§S 192-2642, 19.2-264.4(9.
48. Burm, 541 S.E.2d at 893.
49. 537 S.E2d 866 (Va. 2000).
50. Bunm, 541 S.E2d at 893; se Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (Va. 2000)
(stating that a jury's determination, under Sections 192-264.2 and 192-264.4(Q of the Virginia
Gde, regarding whether a defendant "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat to society" is not restricted to a consideration of onlythe prison society).
51. Bum, 541 S.E2d at 893.
52. Id
53. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
54. Bumn, 541 S.E2d at 893 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 604 n.12 (1978)); sw
Cherrix v. Commonweahh, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (giving the court wide latitude to
exclude mitigating evidence).





The court went onto distinguish the cases relied upon byBums, specifically
Gard,m'v Fkrida,8 Sk# 'v Soh Gtudi/n, 9 and Smnam v Saah * n i .60 The
court noted that in Ganw, the trial court imposed a death sentence after review-
ing the contents of a pre-sentence report that had not been fully disclosed to the
defendant. Though Burm did not involve evidence not fully disclosed to the
defendant, Ganb could still be read to give defendants a constitutional right to
rebuttal. In GmW, the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant have the oppor-
tunity to "deny or explain" any evidence upon which the Commonwealth relies
in making its case for death.' In Burm, the Commonwealth offered evidence of
the defendant's prior criminal record and unadjudicated criminal acts.63 The
implication of such evidence, clearly, is that Bums would commit such crimes in
the future and would, therefore, be a danger to society. Bums's evidence of the
security and nature of prison life, however, would "explain" that the Common-
wealth's evidence of the defendant's prior criminal record (even assuming it is a
predictor of future dangerousness) would likely never be operative because the
defendant would never have the opportunity to pose a threat. Thus, despite
Bumt, Ga may be interpreted to guarantee defendants a constitutional right
to rebut evidence presented bythe Commonwealth that goes toward proving that
a defendant would pose a future danger.
The court distinguished Sker because the evidence proffered in that case
was peculiar to that particular defendant's history and background.6' In Skipper,
the Court required the admission of evidence of the defendant's past good
behavior in jail while awaiting trial.65 The Bus court argued that the ruling in
Sk~ter would not require evidence of prospective adjustment because Bums
sought to introduce general evidence regarding prison life rather than evidence
58. 430 US. 349 (1977).
59. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
60. Bwm, 541 S.El2d at 893-94; seeSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154 (1994) (requir-
ing the giving of an instruction regarding life without parole when future dangerousness is at issue
and defendant is parole ineligible); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1 (1986) (holding that
exclusion from sentencing hearing of testimony regarding defendant's good behavior during time
spent in jail awaiting trial deprived defendant of right to present relevant evidence in mitigation of*
punishment); Gardnerv. Florida, 430 US. 349 (1977) (vacat death sentence and remanding case
where contents of presentence report were not hillydisclosed to defendant).
61. Bwm, 541 S.E2d at 893 (citing Gamb, 430 US. at 353).
62. Gvtw, 430 US. at 362.
63. Bum, 541 S.E.2d at 893.
64. Id at 893-94. The trial court in Skoperrefused to admit the defendant's evidence of his
good behavior in jail while awaiting trial. Skie, 476 US. at 4. The Sk~wrcourt stated that the
relevance of that evidence was highlighted "bythe prosecutor's closing argument, which urged the
jury to return a sentence of death in part because petitioner could not be trusted to behave if he
were simply returned to prison." Id at 5.
65. Bwn, 541 S.E2d at 893 (citing Skqer, 476 US. at 4).
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specific to Bums's own behavior in prison." However, the same rationale
applies in Bum as it did in Skippr. Ajuror should be aware of a defendant's past
good behavior inprison in order to determine if he will be a threat in the future.
Likewise, prison life evidence is relevant to help jurors determine how a prisoner
would adjust to a lifetime of incarceration and whether he is likely to pose a
threat in the future.
Simm, in the court's view, was irrelevant in Bums's case because it merely
required the giving of an instruction regarding life without parole when future
dangerousness is at issue and a defendant is parole ineligible.6
D. Cbmm Ws ClaingA owmt
1. Romme to Bo'as anA nimd
During dosing argument in the penalty phase of this case, the Common-
wealth's Attorney referred to Bums as an "animal." ' After an objection by
Bums's counsel, sustained by the circuit court judge, the Commonwealth's
Attorney retracted the reference.69 Bums's counsel, after the Commonwealth's
Attorney had completed his dosing argument, moved for a mistrial on the
grounds that the reference was improper and prejudicial ° The judge denied the
motion and Bums assigned error to this ruling on appeal."' The Bun court,
noting that bythe time Bums moved for a mistrial the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney had already corrected himself and the judge had stopped the
Commonwealth's Attorney in front of the juryin order for him to do so, found
no error in the circuit court's denial of the motion.72
In a situation such as this, defense counsel must move for a mistrial imme-
diately, that is, as soon as the Commonwealth's Attorneymakes such an inappro-
priate remark before the jury, in order to avoid possible default. 3 Counsel
should also alternatively and secondarily move that the remark be stricken and
for a cautionaryinstruction. 4 If the court does not grant the motion for mistrial,
then the issue will be preserved for appeal and if the instruction is approved, then
the damage done bythe offending remark maybe at least partially mitigated.
66. Id at 894.
67. Id (citing Sinm, 512 US. at 156). See mgovllyKathryn Roe Eldridge, Case Note, 14
CAP. DEF.J. 89 (2001) (analyzing Shaferv. South Carolina, 121 S. 0. 1263 (2001)).




72. Id at 895.
73. S~eReid v. Baumgardner, 232 SE.2d 778,781 (Va. 1977). "Tlhe approved procedure
for counsel to follow is to object to improper argument at the time, giving reasons for the objection,





2. Darer to StJff /L ikdicxod cfEsarpe
The Commonwealth, in its dosing argument, argued that were Bums to
receive life in prison, he would pose a continuing danger to the prison staff and
could even escape from prison." Bums did not object to this argument until
after the jury had retired to deliberate, at which time he moved for a mistrial on
the basis that the Commoriwealth's argument was exactly the kind of argument
that his evidence regarding the security features of a maximum-security prison
and the nature of an inmate's life sought to rebut. 6 The circuit court denied this
motion for not being timely and the Bum court affirmed.'
Defense counsel should anticipate this kind of danger-to-staff/possibility-
of- escape argument in the Commonwealth's final dosing argument. 8 Therefore,
if the trial court has rejected the defense's conditions-of-incarceration evidence,
the defense should move in limine to bar such argument on the part of the
Commonwealth. In support of this motion, the defense should point out that
such arguments depend upon an understanding of institutional securitymeasures.
When the defense's conditions-of-incarceration evidence was prohibited, the jury
was deprived of evidence upon which to base a determination of danger to staff
or likelihood of escape. Thus, the Commonwealth's arguments are unsupported
by any evidence in the case and require the jury to speculate.
E. Six (6 er's Exam
Bums moved for a mental evaluation pursuant to Section 19.2-300 of the
Virginia Code prior to commencement of the penalty phase of the trial, but the
circuit court denied the motion. 9 Burns argued that the circuit court should have
granted the motion because such an evaluation would be of equal value to the
jury as to the judge." The Burm court rejected this claim, citing the language of
the statute and noting that when Bums raised the motion again, after the return
of the jury's sentencing verdicts, the circuit court granted it. 1
The Burns court was correct that the clear language of Section 19.2-300
requires that the motion be made subsequent to conviction. Defense counsel
75. Busa, 541 SE2d at 896.
76. ld at n.17.
77. Id
78. Seyml Cynthia M. Bruce, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 185 (2001) (analyzing Schmitt
v. Commonweath, 547 S.E2d 186 (Va. 200C1).
79. Burns, 541 S.E2d at 895; seealso VA. QODE ANN, S 192-300 (Mfichie 2000) (providing,
in pertinent part, that when anyperson is convicted of "anycriminal offense which indicates sexual
abnormality, the trial judge ... shall upon application of the attorney for the Connwalt, akh...
or counsel for defendant... defer sentence until the report of a mental examination conducted as
provided in S 19.2-301 of the defendant can be secured to gaide djk in determining" how to
sentence the defendant) (emphasis added).




should make such a motion whenever the predicate or gradation offense involves
sexual abnormality. Section 192-264.5 of the Virginia Code requires that before
the imposition of a death sentence the court must direct a probation officer to
prepare and file a report containing information on the defendant's history, the
cimrmnstances of the offense, and a victim impact statement.82 The statute goes
on to state that "[a]fter consideration of the report, ani upongwxd ame show, the
court may set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprison-
ment for life."83 Given that the report contains a victim impact statement and
biographical information about the defendant, the addition of the phrase, "and
upon good cause shown," must indicate that more information than that con-
tained in the report may be brought to bear on the judge's final sentencing
decision. One type of information for the judge to consider would be the
Section 19.2-300 mental evaluation. 4 For example, if the exam revealed that the
defendant's sexuallydeviant behavior was "triggered" bya stimulus not available
to him in prison, the judge could conclude that he would pose no future danger
if sentenced to life in prison.
Jeffrey D. Fazio
82. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-2645 (lchie 2000). The text of the statute mandates that:
When.the punishment of any ron has been fixed at death, the court shall, before
unposing sentence, direct a probation officer of the court tothorougy invesugate the
hsto. hedefe.tand ay and all other relevant facts, to thi ed that thfe court
may be fully dised as to wheer the sentence of death is appropriate and. j.st.
Reports shall be made, presented and filed as rovided in S 19:2-299 except that,
noVtihstanding any other provision of law, such reports shall in all cases contain a
Victim Impact Statiment. Sch statement shall contain the same information and be
prepared in the same manner as Victim Impact Statements pursuant to S 192-299.1.
After consideration of the report, and upon good cause shown, the court may set aside
the sentence of death and iimpose a sentence of imprisonment for life.
Id
83. Id (emphasis added).
84. See S 192-300.
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